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CLAIMS IN OKLAHOMA BY A MORTGAGOR 
TO A CONDEMNATION AWARD: 
THE EFFECT OF FORECLOSURE 
Rex J. Zedalis* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the years, legal analyses have appeared in the literature about a mort-
gagor’s ability to insist upon an interest in a condemnation award granted against 
property mortgaged by the indebted.1 The analyses have been based upon, and have 
received support from, extensive case law maintaining essentially that any condem-
nation award stands in the place of mortgaged property considered “taken” by rele-
vant government action. As such, an interest on the part of the mortgagor proves 
indubitable, though as the mortgagee/lender also possesses a parallel interest, repay-
ment of the loan extended by the mortgagee is subject to satisfaction out of the pro-
ceeds of the condemnation award.2 
In contradistinction to that ample literature, the matter on which I now propose 
to offer some preliminary thoughts, with particular focus on Oklahoma, is the rarely 
addressed issue of a mortgagor’s interest in a condemnation award after the mortgage 
                                                          
 *  Professor of Law and Fellow, Sustainable Energy and Resources Law, University of Tulsa; Phyllis Hurley 
Frey Professor (2010-2013); J.S.D (1987) and W.B. Cutting Fellow (1980-81), Columbia University. Work on this 
article was supported by the University of Tulsa College of Law's Summer Stipend program. 
 1.  For what is perhaps the leading survey of this area of the law, penned in the mid-1960s, see generally Harold 
Don Teague, Condemnation of Mortgaged Property, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1535 (1965-66). For other surveys, focusing heavily 
on a mortgagee’s interest in a condemnation award, see Annotation, Protection of Rights of Mortgagee in Eminent Domain 
Proceedings, 58 A.L.R. 1534 (1927); Annotation, Protection of Rights of Mortgagee in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 110 A.L.R. 
542 (1937); Annotation, Right of Mortgagee in Award in Eminent Domain Proceedings, 154 A.L.R. 1110 (1945). For a survey 
focusing on the significance for mortgagors and mortgagees of when the condemnation occurred, in relation to the 
foreclosure on the mortgage, see H.D. Warren, Annotation, Rights in Respect of Proceeds of an Award in Eminent Domain 
Proceedings made after Mortgage Foreclosure Sale, 170 A.L.R. 272 (1947).  
 2.  For cases illustrative of the mortgagor and mortgagee’s interests, see Owen County v. Morgan, 59 S.W.2d 18 
(Ky. 1900) (noting the mortgagee has interest when total taking of property occurs); Collector of Taxes of City of 
Boston v. Revere Bldg. Inc., 177 N.E. 577 (Mass. 1931) (same proposition as preceding case); Snyder v. Chicago, S.F. 
& C. Ry. Co., 20 S.W. 885 (Mo. 1892) (noting mortgagor has interest when total taking of property occurs); State v. 
Holland, 367 S.W.2d 791 (Tenn. App. 1962) (same proposition as preceding case, but saying mortgagee has equitable 
claim for satisfaction of its loan balance); City of Chicago v. Salinger, 52 N.E.2d 184 (Ill. 1943) (mortgagee has interest 
when partial taking of property occurs); In re Dillman, 267 N.W. 623 (Mich. 1936) (same proposition as preceding, 
and applied in context of mortgagee having to foreclose on mortgagor and seek recovery from condemnation award 
as well); Swanson v. United States, 156 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1946) (same proposition as preceding case, but saying 
interest is only to extent of payments then presently due on loan); Aggs v. Shackelford County, 19 S.W. 1085 (Tex. 
1892) (mortgagor has interest when partial taking of property occurs); Carson Redevelopment Agency v. Adam, 186 
Cal. Rptr. 615 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (eminent domain award seen as substitute collateral for securing mortgagee’s loan 
to mortgagor). 
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that secures the mortgagor’s debt has actually been foreclosed, the subject property 
sold, and its sale confirmed.3 Clearly, a situation of this sort would not arise in the 
event the nature of the government action resulting in a “taking” involved the entirety 
of the mortgaged property being placed in the hands of the government. For in such 
an instance, there would remain in the hands of a mortgagor no mortgaged property 
to be subjected to foreclosure and subsequent sale. Instead, the situation with which 
I am here concerned would involve a condemnation award granted in the context of 
either a “taking” by the government resulting, more commonly, from a physical in-
vasion of only a part of a mortgaged piece of property, or resulting, much less com-
monly, from government regulatory measures considered to so extensively interfere 
with the mortgagor’s interest in the subject property that compensation is constitu-
tionally mandated.4 In both situations, a mortgagor would continue to possess prop-
erty subject to a mortgage upon which a foreclosure action, sale, and confirmation 
could be executed. 
With focus on such narrow situations, the interest of the mortgagor remaining 
in the mortgaged property necessarily presents the question of whether what is trans-
formed into an interest in a condemnation award survives a foreclosure sale and court 
confirmation, so as to allow the mortgagor to maintain a cause of action for proceeds 
of the award? Concern is not with whether the foreclosure sale and confirmation 
somehow end an interest on the part of a mortgagee/lender in a condemnation 
award, since its debt must be satisfied notwithstanding foreclosure.5 Rather, concern 
is with the ability of the mortgagor, who has experienced a foreclosure and sale, to 
insist on an interest in an antecedent condemnation award representing property 
“taken” by earlier governmental physical or regulatory invasion. Presumably, such an 
interest could be said to remain in a sort of inchoate form, by virtue of the above 
referenced mortgagee/lender being able to get at the award in order to satisfy the 
debt owed by the mortgagor. That would especially seem to be so in the usual in-
stance of the foreclosure sale resulting in a purchase of the subject property by a 
third-party buyer. 
                                                          
 3.  For some of the important Oklahoma cases addressing the general matter of condemnation awards and 
access to such awards by the mortgagor or the mortgagee, see Morse v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Marshall Cty., 38 P.2d 
945 (Okla. 1934); Binding-Stevens Seed Co. v. Local Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 45 P.2d 132 (Okla. 1935); Miller v. Durrill, 
55 P.2d 953 (Okla. 1936); Muller v. McCann, 151 P. 621 (Okla. 1915); Gourley v. Williams, 149 P. 229 (Okla. 1915); 
Bruner v. Ft. Smith & W.R. Co., 127 P. 700 (Okla. 1912); Crowell v. Young, 64 S.W. 607 (Ct. App. Ind. T. 1901); 
Ferguson v. City of Hooker, 36 P.2d 18 (Okla. 1934); Diel v. Blanchard, 225 P. 962 (Okla. 1924); State ex rel. Dept. 
of Transp. v. Pendergraft, 919 P.2d 451 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996); City of Stilwell v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop., 870 F. 
Supp. 1025 (E.D. Okla. 1994). 
 4.  For the distinction between physical invasions amounting to a taking, and regulatory measures that affect 
property in a manner that might constitute a taking, see especially Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 
(Holmes, J., recognizing that “takings” can come through government regulation, as well as direct appropriative 
action); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (Scalia, J., recognizing the same distinction). 
It should be observed that both these cases, and others that draw the foregoing distinction, are not concerned, as we 
are in this essay, with takings in the context of foreclosures of mortgages on the affected property, and consequent 
claims being made to the taking awards by the mortgagor suffering the foreclosure.  
 5.  Obviously, this statement would have to be qualified by the possibility of so-called anti-deficiency legislation 
limiting the extent of mortgagee recovery for a deficiency resulting from a foreclosure sale producing less than what 
the mortgagor has remaining as their outstanding mortgage balance. 
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But what if the sale at foreclosure is to the very governmental entity whose 
actions precipitated the “taking” suit and eventuated in the condemnation award? Is 
it possible such a purchaser could insist that, since the earlier condemnation award 
stands in the place of the property that was under mortgage, when the mortgage was 
foreclosed and sale made and confirmed to the government body whose actions pre-
cipitated the award, the government bought both the relevant property and the con-
demnation award itself? Clearly, the consequence of such would suggest that, per-
haps, the award is now to be viewed as owned by the acting governmental body. 
Additionally, as such, the effect is, essentially, to extinguish the need to make payment 
on the award, for, in the final analysis, one never really owes money to oneself.6 
The consequence of any such argument would be to affect both the mortgagor 
who has suffered foreclosure, and the mortgagee/lender who has exercised foreclo-
sure in order to assert its rights to receive a return of monies loaned to the mortgagor 
to consummate the mortgagor’s original purchase of the subject property. If purchase 
of a foreclosed property by the governmental entity, whose actions earlier resulted in 
a condemnation award, eventuates in that entity holding both the affected property 
and the condemnation award, it could be suggested that no interest remains on which 
either the mortgagor or the mortgagee/lender could rely in order to seek recourse 
against the award itself. 
In thinking about any such situation, and a mortgagor’s rights, the place to begin 
involves the terms and conditions of the usual mortgage or deed of trust instrument 
securing the loan to the mortgagor. By way of illustration, take what is said in the 
mortgage used in a recent Oklahoma trial court case,7 and in both the Fannie Mae/
Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust and their Uniform Mortgage.8 Among other 
things, these will provide for certain obligations and duties, including the duty to 
                                                          
 6.  For a case in which this problem and suggestion of that sort of reasoning, see Smith v. State ex rel. Dept. of 
Transp., CV-11-47, Order (Dist. Ct. Delaware Cnty., OK, Filed Feb. 11, 2016) (on file with author) (indicating 
“ODOT maintains that its purchase of the property on March 26, 2013 included the $310,000.00 judgment and that 
it therefore did not have to pay the judgment . . . .”) (hereinafter “Smith v. ODOT”). However, the Restatement, infra 
note 38, indicates in section 7.1, cmt. a., that the purchaser at foreclosure sale takes the property in exactly the same 
status it had prior to the existence of the mortgage, and as the condemnation award post-dated the mortgage, it is 
difficult to accept any argument that would allow a government entity responsible for a taking to suggest that its 
foreclosure purchase also resulted in a purchase of the condemnation award. Restatement, infra note 38, § 7.1 cmt. a. 
After all, if what the purchaser gets at foreclosure sale is the property in exactly the condition it was in at the time of 
the mortgage, since there had yet to be any taking and condemnation award at that time, how could the purchaser 
claim its acquisition gave it the condemnation award. For case law supporting the Restatement’s position, see Scharaga 
v. Schwartzberg, 149 A.D.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (purchaser acquires title as it stood at the time of the mort-
gage). It should be noted that Oklahoma would appear to allow someone other than the property’s owner at the time 
of the suffering of the taking—e.g., purchaser at foreclosure—to claim the condemnation award in two circumstances: 
(1) the owner at taking was unaware of such because the taking was not apparent; (2) the owner at taking specifically 
transfers the right to recover to the foreclosure purchase. See Consolidated Gas Service Co. v. Tyler, 63 P.2d 88 (Okla. 
1936); Rogers v. Okla. City, 120 P.2d 997 (Okla. 1942), (overruled in 1976) and Drabek v. City of Norman, 946 P.2d 
658 (Okla. 1996). It should also be noted, however, in Smith v. ODOT neither of these exceptions to the basic rule 
applied. See also text accompanying infra notes 55-57 regarding the significance of the timing of the taking and who 
then owns the property. 
 7.  See Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6 (actually, the two mortgages used in that case, both on file with the author, 
are typical of the mortgage instruments used at that time by the mortgagee, Arvest Bank). 
 8.  For reference to the language of the relevant Fannie/Freddie Uniform security instruments, see GRANT S. 
NELSON, DALE A. WHITMAN, ANN M. BURKHARDT, R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, 
FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT, App. A at 1237, 1240-60 (8th ed. 2015).  
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make regular and timely payments on the promissory note that accompanies the 
mortgage or deed of trust. In the context of addressing other complex and sundry 
matters, the mortgage instrument or deed of trust typically contains language speak-
ing to the possibility that the property to which the mortgage or deed of trust relates 
could, during the lifetime of the mortgage or deed of trust, suffer damage or physical 
harm for which an obligated casualty insurer may be forced to make payment. That 
same, or another companion provision in the mortgage or deed of trust, will typically 
contain as well additional language speaking to the matter of a governmental taking 
of the relevant property that results in a condemnation award. 
Classic language on that score, found in paragraph eleven of both the Fannie 
Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust and the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uni-
form Mortgage, reads: “In the event of a total taking . . . of the Property . . . Miscel-
laneous Proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by this Security Instrument, 
whether or not then due, with the excess, if any, paid to Borrower.”9 The Uniform 
Deed of Trust defines “Miscellaneous Proceeds” to mean “any compensation, settle-
ment, award of damages, or proceeds paid by any third party[,]” including for “con-
demnation or other taking of all or part of the Property.”10 Paragraph eleven also 
notes that  
In the event of a partial taking . . . in which the fair market value of the Property im-
mediately before the partial taking . . . is equal to or greater than the amount of the 
sums secured by this Security Instrument immediately before the partial taking . . . 
unless Borrower and Lender otherwise agree in writing, the sums secured by this Se-
curity Instrument shall be reduced by the amount of the Miscellaneous Proceeds . . . 
.11  
And, when a partial taking involves property which immediately before the taking has 
a value less than the sums secured, the “Miscellaneous Proceeds shall be applied to 
the sums secured by this Security Instrument whether or not the sums are then 
due.”12 The only exception in the latter case would be if the Borrower and Lender 
other agree in writing.13 
As an interesting comparison, but with an import replicating that of both the 
Uniform Mortgage and Uniform Deed of Trust, at least with regard to the interest of 
the mortgagee/lender in getting at the proceeds of a taking award, there is the lan-
guage of a mortgage involved in an Oklahoma trial court case in which a mortgagor 
who suffered a taking and then had the affected property foreclosed upon and sold 
to the offending government entity, later sought to make a claim for recovery under 
the taking award.14 Paragraph eighteen of the mortgage in that case, a paragraph en-
titled “Condemnation,” obligates the mortgagor to provide the mortgagee/lender 
                                                          
 9.  Id. at 1249. 
 10.  Id. at 1241. 
 11.  Id. at 1249. 
 12.  Id. at 1250. 
 13.  See NELSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 1250. 
 14.  See Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6. 
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with prompt notice of actions by public entities to take all or any part of the mort-
gaged property.15 It then continues by further indicating the mortgagor authorizes 
mortgagee/lender intervention in any such action. And, most significantly, in the par-
agraph’s third sentence it provides: “Mortgagor assigns to Lender the proceeds of 
any award or claim for damages connected with a condemnation or other taking of 
all or any part of the [mortgaged] Property.”16 
With the foregoing as contextual background, there would appear to be at least 
three reasons to believe that, once a mortgagor who has incurred a government taking 
of its mortgaged property finds the affected property foreclosed upon and sold to the 
government entity whose actions constituted the taking, any award of compensation 
for that governmental action no longer remains subject to a successful claim by the 
mortgagor. While each of the three reasons will be explored in some detail below, it 
must be noted that inability of the original mortgagor to be able to press a claim to 
the compensation award does not suggest that the government, in making a purchase 
of the affected property at the foreclosure sale buys the earlier award itself. Nor does 
the original mortgagor’s ability to be able to press a claim to the compensation award 
after a foreclosure sale mean that the mortgagee/lender who financed the original 
purchase finds itself in the same position as the mortgagor. The mortgagee/lender 
extended credit for the purchase and remains entitled to have the obligation owed to 
it fully satisfied. Indeed, that very point would seem reflected in the language quoted 
above and appearing in the referenced mortgage and deed of trust instruments. 
Though not speaking to satisfaction of the mortgagee/lender’s debt in the context of 
a foreclosure sale, in emphasizing the ability of the mortgagee/lender to get at taking 
awards, the language makes clear the priority position accorded the mortgagee/
lender. 
II. THE TERMS OF THE MORTGAGE OR DEED OF TRUST INSTRUMENT 
The first of the three reasons to believe the original mortgagor who has suffered 
a foreclosure sale has no demonstrable legal interest in an earlier pre-foreclosure con-
demnation award in which the government entity responsible for the taking pur-
chased at the sale itself, can arise from the terms of the original lending instrument 
binding upon the mortgagor. 
As indicated above, the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Deed of Trust and 
Mortgage instruments, as well as the illustrative mortgage instrument utilized in the 
referenced Oklahoma case, contain language that tie the hands of mortgagors.17 With 
regard to the former, both the Uniform Deed of Trust and the Uniform Mortgage 
make clear that a borrower who enters into such is to expect that, in the event of a 
total taking of the financed property, compensation awarded for such taking, goes to 
the lender to be applied to satisfying the borrowed amount, whether or not then 
                                                          
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. at ¶ 18. 
 17.  See NELSON ET AL., supra note 8; Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6. 
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due.18 Only in the event that the amount of the award exceeds the amount due and 
owed by the borrower, is the borrower in a position of expecting that the residual 
will be forwarded in their direction.19 And again, if the taking is partial, such as we 
are interested in here, because of the existence of foreclosure after a taking, the sums 
resulting from the condemnation are to be applied to satisfying the debt incurred by 
the borrower in originally purchasing the subject property.20 Contractually, any bor-
rower entering into a lending instrument in the form of the Uniform Deed of Trust 
or Mortgage binds themselves to having the proceeds of a condemnation award, con-
cerning the property that is the subject of the lending instrument, applied to satisfying 
the debt owed to the lender. 
Though much less comprehensive in its expressions on the matter of condem-
nation awards, the illustrative mortgage instrument employed in the cited Oklahoma 
trial court case has much the same thrust as the language in the Uniform Fannie Mae/
Freddie Mac security instruments. Essentially, it calls for the mortgagee/lender to 
have a priority position regarding sums awarded in condemnation claims concerning 
mortgaged property.21 Of some significance, the illustrative mortgage, unlike the Uni-
form Fannie and Freddie instruments, speaks not at all to the possibility that a con-
demnation award may exceed the outstanding loan balance on the mortgaged prop-
erty. Rather than indicating, as those Uniform instruments do, that in such an instance 
the excess of the award over the loan balance is to be paid to the mortgagor on the 
original loan, the only thing noted in the language of the illustrative instrument is that, 
when one agrees to the instrument’s terms, the borrower automatically and instantly 
assigns all claims to condemnation awards to the lender.22 The implication, of course, 
is that the only mortgage party that has any interest in sums from a condemnation 
award is the lender. By the very terms of the third sentence of paragraph eighteen of 
the illustrative mortgage contract, the entering into of the mortgage contract itself 
transfers any potential interest of the mortgagor/borrower in a condemnation award 
to the lender alone.23 
It is clear that neither the language of the illustrative mortgage, nor that of the 
Fannie and Freddie Uniform instruments speaks directly to the question of whether 
                                                          
 18.  See NELSON ET AL., supra note 8, at 1249. 
 19.  See id. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  See Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6., at ¶ 18. 
 22.  See id. 
 23.  See id. Again, it bears noting that the Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform instruments provide the mort-
gagor/borrower with at least some potential argument about having a continuing interest in property affected by a 
taking and then sold in a foreclosure sale. Specifically, that springs from the pertinent language of those Uniform 
instruments providing for any excess of a condemnation award over a mortgage balance to be paid to the mortgagor. 
Not only does no such language appear in the illustrative mortgage contract at issue in the referenced Oklahoma 
case, Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6, the language of that very contract seems emphatic that, once the contract has 
been consummated between the lender and the borrower, the effect is that of the mortgagor/borrower “assign[ing]” 
all interests in the proceeds of a condemnation award to the mortgagee/lender. See illustrative mortgage language in 
Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6. That could suggest that, unlike with the Fannie/Freddie instruments, the illustrative 
Oklahoma case mortgage is much clearer in indicating that no mortgagor/borrower interest remains in a condemna-
tion award. All such interests have been assigned with entry into of the security instrument itself. The Fannie/Freddie 
instruments, on the other hand, stress the mortgagor’s retention of an interest by virtue of their reference to how the 
excess of a condemnation award over the mortgage balance is to be handled. 
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a mortgagor who has suffered a partial taking and then had the mortgaged property 
foreclosed on and sold to the government entity responsible for the taking continues 
to have a sufficient interest in property to maintain a claim against the sum awarded 
as compensation for the taking itself. It is one thing to indicate that the entering into 
of a security instrument transfers to the mortgagee/lender the opportunity to receive 
compensation following a condemnation award. And it is another thing entirely to 
provide that a condemnation award granted on the heels of a government taking, and 
then followed by a foreclosure and sale of the subject property to the government 
entity executing the taking, renders the mortgagor/borrower without any remaining 
interest in the monies awarded for the condemnation. Likewise, the same can be said 
about providing that a taking of property secured by a Fannie or Freddie Uniform 
security instrument results in the deed of trust or mortgage lender having a superior 
claim to use of the condemnation award to satisfy the original loan, with any portion 
of that award being available to distribute to the borrower only in the event of the 
award exceeding the outstanding balance on the loan. Providing for such speaks not 
at all to the matter of whether a mortgagor retains any interest in an earlier condem-
nation award after suffering a foreclosure and sale of the remainder of the mortgaged 
property to the government entity whose acts resulted in the condemnation itself. 
There are two points that can be made at this juncture, however. First, neither 
the language of the illustrative mortgage in the referenced Oklahoma case, or that of 
the Fannie and Freddie Uniform security instruments addresses our particular ques-
tion of concern. Despite this, it would not seem entirely unreasonable to draw an 
inference of significance from the language they do contain. Specifically, there can be 
little doubt that the language of either of these instruments is designed to communi-
cate that, once accepted by a mortgagor/borrower, the relationship of the mortgagor 
to the subject property and any condemnation award that stands in its place is 
changed. Whereas the usual state of things may find a mortgagor as the owner of a 
mortgaged property, as well as of any condemnation award representing the property, 
language such as that in the sample security instruments alters that usual state—ad-
vancing the claim of the mortgagee/lender to a position of superiority over the mort-
gagor. In view of such an altered situation, it would not distend reason too wildly to 
imagine that, if a mortgagee/lender is placed in a superior position to a mortgagor in 
relation to a condemnation award connected with a mortgaged property, then in the 
event the mortgagee has to subsequently foreclose and sell a property affected by an 
earlier condemnation award, perhaps the mortgagor’s ability to assert a successful 
claim against the condemnation award is to be seen as even more inferior. After all, 
the mortgagor’s position of subordination to the mortgagee/lender by virtue of the 
language in the security instrument regarding condemnation awards is magnified by 
the fact the mortgagor subsequently defaults on its security, resulting in foreclosure 
sale, and extinguishment of the mortgagor’s interest in the subject property. With the 
language in the security instrument subordinating the mortgagor/borrower to the 
lender, and confirmed foreclosure sale ending all interest in the subject property, 
there would seem little upon which the original borrower could rest a claim to any 
such earlier condemnation award. 
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The second point worth mentioning has to do with the possible contention 
that, as a result of any foreclosure sale purchase of the sort just referenced being made 
to the very government entity whose actions had precipitated the earlier condemna-
tion award, the government managed to acquire both the foreclosed property, as well 
as the condemnation award itself. The implication flowing from the acquisition of 
the condemnation award being that, with such now held by the government, nothing 
exists upon which the poor suffering mortgagor/borrower can rest its claim to pro-
ceeds of the earlier award. Having lost title to the mortgaged property in the foreclo-
sure sale, it also lost the basis upon which to assert a continuing claim to the con-
demnation award standing in its place. 
Yet there seems no particular reason to believe the only way to reach the con-
clusion a mortgagor so situated has no legitimate claim to an earlier condemnation 
award is to rest it on the notion that, at foreclosure, the acting government entity 
bought both the subject property and the earlier award itself. Were that not the case, 
what would prevent a government entity from acting in a fashion constituting a par-
tial taking of a mortgagor’s property, with the effect being that if, what remained in 
the mortgagor were property used for a business enterprise, it would be so imperiled 
by the taking as to prevent sufficient income activity necessary to meet full payment 
on the mortgage obligation itself? At such a juncture, the government entity precipi-
tating the taking that led to complicating the business enterprise could then complete 
a foreclosure sale purchase at a price, when added to the sum of the earlier condem-
nation award, considerably below the original loan amount. The result effectively 
would be to reward the government for behavior considered sufficiently troublesome 
under the Constitution to require the payment of just compensation. Were the gov-
ernment to have purchased the property in a fair market, arms-length transaction, it 
would have settled at a price higher than ultimately paid. But by acting in a fashion 
that both constituted a partial taking—for which compensation was ordered—and 
also had the effect of stressing the on-going business enterprise conducted thereon 
and leading to an eventual foreclosure sale, it might acquire the property at a consid-
erable reduction. 
The alternative route for arriving at the conclusion that, once a foreclosure sale 
of property that has suffered a partial taking has been confirmed, there remains no 
ongoing basis for the original mortgagor/borrower to assert a claim to the earlier 
condemnation award, is found in the language of either the Uniform Fannie/Freddie 
or illustrative security instruments reviewed several paragraphs above. Though it is 
beyond question that such language does not directly and explicitly speak to the mat-
ter, it is crystal clear that such language provides that the contractual commitment of 
the mortgagor/borrower from the moment of execution of the security instruments 
is the assignment to the mortgagee/lender of the proceeds from a condemnation 
award. Nowhere in such instruments is reference made to the possibility that, in the 
event the purchaser at a subsequent foreclosure sale of the subject property winds-
up being the government entity that precipitated the taking award, then the proceeds 
from such are to be considered as held by the government itself. And it is equally as 
clear that nowhere in the relevant language of such instruments is provision made for 
8
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the original mortgagor/borrower having some kind of continuing claim to such pro-
ceeds in the event of experiencing a subsequent foreclosure sale. 
All this makes sense, in light of the fact the mortgagor and the mortgagee are 
the original interested parties—interested in the property used as security, the repay-
ment of the loan used to purchase the property, and any proceeds that might be seen 
as representing the property due to a condemnation or government taking. The mort-
gagee/lender should always expect to receive satisfaction on the loan it made, 
whether or not the subject property has been confiscated or taken by government 
action. If that comes from payment being made by the mortgagor/borrower, or from 
having a priority claim to the proceeds of a condemnation award, is immaterial. In 
the event payment comes via the priority claim approach, and arises by virtue of lan-
guage such as that appearing in the Fannie or Freddie Uniform instrument, or the 
illustrative mortgage involved in the cited Oklahoma trial court case, it would seem 
the original mortgagor relinquishes, from the outset, all interest in sums flowing from 
condemnation awards. 
III. MORTGAGOR’S INTEREST TO SUE EXTINGUISHED AFTER FORECLOSURE 
SALE 
A complete paucity of case law exists both in Oklahoma and elsewhere on the 
matter of a mortgagor’s ability to maintain a cause of action for sums paid in an earlier 
condemnation award once that mortgagor has suffered a foreclosure sale of the mort-
gaged property.24 The Missouri appellate court’s 2001 decision in City of Brentwood v. 
Barron Holdings International, Ltd., a decision left standing by that state’s Supreme Court 
refusal to grant rehearing, comes closest to that particular factual configuration and 
provides a second reason for believing that a mortgagor who has suffered a foreclo-
sure sale has no claim to the proceeds of an earlier partial taking condemnation 
award.25 The only caveat, however, is that City of Brentwood involved not a situation in 
which the mortgagor advanced a claim on its own behalf against the proceeds of an 
earlier condemnation award, but rather a claim that the court, which was then actually 
holding the proceeds of the condemnation award, distribute the award to the mort-
gagee/lender for application against the principal due on the mortgage obligating the 
mortgagor.26 
Factually, it appears that the mortgagor, Barron Holdings, owed somewhere in 
the vicinity of $3 million on mortgaged property it then owned within the limits of 
the City of Brentwood.27 The City then took eminent domain action against the prop-
erty, resulting in the City being compelled, in accordance with the requirements of 
Missouri law, to pay into the registry of the court the sum of $1.24 million following 
a determination of value on November 22, 2000.28 A month later, on December 21, 
                                                          
 24. See In re Dillman, 267 N.W. 623 (Mich. 1936), for a case of a mortgagee seeking access to condemnation award 
in context of a foreclosure against a mortgagor. 
 25. 66 S.W. 3d 139 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 142. 
 28. See id. at 141. 
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2000, at noon, the mortgagee/lender then sold the property at a foreclosure sale, with 
Barron Holdings neither being present at the sale, nor filing a court challenge 
thereto.29 
On the exact same date as the foreclosure sale, at precisely thirty-seven minutes 
past noon, Barron Holdings, the mortgagor, made its request, ex parte, to the court to 
distribute the proceeds of the condemnation award to the mortgagee/lender for the 
benefit of the account owing by the mortgagor.30 Barron’s ex parte request was 
granted, but on January 9, 2001, in response to various motions of procedural objec-
tion filed by the mortgagee/lender on January 5, 2001, and a subsequent hearing as-
sociated therewith, the court reversed itself and set aside the December 21 ex parte 
distribution order.31 The court’s position, as expressed in a February 13, 2001, order 
and decree quoted in the Missouri appellate court’s decision of interest here, was that, 
because the mortgagee/lender had foreclosed on Barron, it was the mortgagee, and 
not the mortgagor, that was deemed “superior both in title and in right to claim . . . 
distribution . . . .”32 
On February 23, 2001, Barron filed an appeal.33 The appellate court decision 
of interest here noted that the appeal could only be heard in the event the appellate 
court was vested with jurisdiction, which required an aggrieved party be maintaining 
the cause of action. In line with the earlier view expressed by the trial court, the de-
cision on appeal went against the mortgagor/borrower on the basis that loss, through 
the foreclosure sale, of any claim to the property affected by the earlier condemnation 
award served to divest the mortgagor of the essential basis for insisting upon a con-
tinuing interest in that award. In the words of the appellate court’s opinion: “When 
Bank [i.e., mortgagee/lender] foreclosed on the property and Barron allowed this to 
go unchallenged, Barron lost the opportunity to complain about the distribution.”34 
In terms of the ability of the mortgagor to appeal the determination of the trial court 
not to accede to the mortgagor’s request that it be permitted to direct that court to 
distribute the condemnation award to the mortgagee/lender in favor of the mort-
gagor’s account, the effect differs not at all from the effect that would result from a 
situation in which a mortgagor sought to make a claim to have direct recourse to an 
earlier such award. That is to say, once a mortgagor has suffered a foreclosure sale of 
property earlier hit by a government taking resulting in a condemnation award, the 
Missouri appellate court seems to have held the mortgagor has lost any interest in the 
property sufficient to warrant the appropriateness of permitting it to maintain an ac-
tion regarding that award.35 
                                                          
 29. See id. 
 30. City of Brentwood, 66 S.W.3d at 141. 
 31. See id. 
 32. See id. at 142.  
 33. See id. 
 34. Id. at 143. 
 35. For that interpretation of the case by leading mortgage scholars, see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, 
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 162, n.4 (5th ed., 2007) (discussing City of Brentwood, 66 S.W.3d 139 and noting, “the 
mortgagee completed a foreclosure against the mortgagor after the condemnation award was deposited into the court. 
The court held that the mortgagor had no standing to pursue an appeal of the condemnation proceeding, since its 
rights had been destroyed by the foreclosure.”). 
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Again, our focus is only on the ability of a mortgagor who has earlier experi-
enced a compensable taking to get at the proceeds associated with a condemnation 
determination, once the mortgagor has experienced a foreclosure sale. On that score, 
City of Brentwood can be read as suggesting that, whether concerned about the ability 
of a mortgagor so situated to maintain an appeal of a trial court determination deny-
ing the mortgagor to direct how the proceeds of the award are to be distributed, or 
concerned about the ability of a mortgagor to make a direct claim against the pro-
ceeds of such an award, once a foreclosure sale has been executed, the mortgagor 
loses the very connection essential to maintain such an action. Without straying be-
yond the narrow focus of this essay, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that, this 
does not mean such a mortgagor is somehow estopped from receiving the benefit of 
a distribution to a mortgagee/lender. Clearly, the mortgagee is entitled to receive 
compensation for its loan. It should not, however, be able to expect compensation 
beyond the amount of its security. Thus, not only must distributions made to a mort-
gagee be attributed or credited to the account of the mortgagor, to the extent con-
demnation award distributions exceed the outstanding mortgage balance, it would 
seem most appropriate for such excess to be forwarded by the mortgagee/lender to 
the mortgagor. 
To reemphasize the principal point, however, a foreclosure sale, whether made 
to a third party, or to the very government entity involved in the earlier taking award, 
removes from the mortgagor the sine qua non essential for claiming any sums from the 
earlier award. It is the existence of the legal interest in the mortgaged property that is 
the subject of the taking by a government entity that provides the mortgagor with 
claim against the proceeds of the condemnation award. As long as the mortgagor 
retains that legal interest in the property, it retains an interest in sums awarded due to 
the taking. With a confirmation of a foreclosure sale, the mortgagor’s interest is ex-
tinguished—just as is the mortgagor’s equity of redemption.36 Being then left without 
any remaining interest in the mortgaged property, nothing exists upon which to rest 
a claim by the mortgagor to either be permitted to direct how the proceeds of the 
condemnation award should be distributed—as the mortgagor asserted in City of 
Brentwood—or, implicitly, as well, that the mortgagor should have the proceeds of an 
earlier such award then held by the court paid into the hands of the mortgagor. In 
the absence of a legally recognized interest in the property, nothing is present upon 
which to rest any claim advanced by the mortgagor. 
                                                          
 36. See NELSON ET AL., supra note 35, at 569 (noting the mortgagor’s equity of redemption can be exercised “at 
any time until a valid foreclosure sale.”); see also, Portland Mortg. Co. v. Creditors Protective Ass’n, 262 P.2d 918, 922 
(Or. 1953) (indicating “equity of redemption is the right to redeem from the mortgage . . . until this right is barred by 
a decree of foreclosure”) (quoting Sellwood v. Gray, 5 P. 198 (Or. 1884)). It is typically understood that the finality 
of a determination of the validity of a decree of foreclosure occurs upon the issuance by the court of an order of 
confirmation of a foreclosure sale. An illustration of this in Oklahoma appears in the language of the typical “Journal 
Entry of Judgment” of foreclosure, see Vol. 5A Vernon’s Oklahoma Forms 2d Real Estate, 378, § 5.65 (2000) (it is 
further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that “from and after the said [foreclosure] sale . . . Defendants . . . are hereby 
forever barred and foreclosed of and from any and all . . . equity of redemption”) and “Order Confirming Sheriff’s 
Sale and Disbursing Sale Proceeds,” id. 382, § 5.68 (final acknowledgment of the validity of the foreclosure sale). 
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It should not be thought that, just because the appellate court’s decision in City 
of Brentwood dealt specifically with the absence of a mortgagor who has suffered a 
foreclosure sale to be able to successfully challenge a lower court determination deny-
ing that mortgagor’s request to designate how monies from a condemnation award 
should be distributed, means the decision lacks relevance when it comes to the dis-
tinct matter of such a mortgagor being able to directly make a claim against such an 
award for its own immediate and personal benefit.37 After all, if subsequent to suf-
fering a foreclosure sale of property that had earlier been affected by a compensable 
government taking, a mortgagor then so situated is considered to lack sufficient legal 
interest in the property to entitle it to prosecute an appeal regarding such an unfavor-
able lower court decision, it would seem hard to imagine a mortgagor situated in 
precisely the same position being able to successfully assert a claim on its own part 
to the proceeds of the earlier condemnation award. Having insufficient interest in the 
subject property after foreclosure sale to permit maintaining an appeal of an unfavor-
able lower court determination on the matter of directing how a condemnation award 
should be distributed, a mortgagor so situated would seem to face an even more 
significant lack of interest when it comes to making a claim to have the proceeds of 
such an award paid immediately and directly to it. Surely, if one who has suffered a 
foreclosure sale cannot expect to have a court heed its request to pay such proceeds 
to the mortgagee/lender, how could it expect heed to be accorded its request to pay 
the proceeds directly to the mortgagor? With foreclosure sale confirmation extin-
guishing the mortgagor’s interest in the subject property, lost are the authority to 
direct the court to pay such proceeds to the mortgagee/lender, appeal any lower court 
refusal to follow such a request from the mortgagor, or request that such proceeds 
be paid directly to the mortgagor itself. 
IV. APPROACH CONSONANT WITH HOW CASUALTY INSURANCE AWARDS 
TREATED 
The third reason for believing that a mortgagor who has suffered a foreclosure 
sale has no ability to successfully advance a claim against the proceeds of an earlier 
condemnation award has to do with the way in which mortgagor claims to casualty 
insurance awards have been treated. Essentially, the law of mortgages views proceeds 
from casualty insurance awards and those from condemnation determinations much 
the same. What is said regarding the former, would thus seem to offer insight regard-
ing the latter. Concerning insurance awards and condemnation awards, both the Re-
statement of the Law (Third) of Property: Mortgages,38 and the prominent 1995 Oklahoma 
Supreme Court case of Wilson v. Glancy prove instructive.39 
With respect to the Restatement, sections 4.7 and 4.8 provide particular illumi-
nation. Both sections quite clearly indicate that casualty insurance awards and awards 
arising from eminent domain (or taking/condemnation) actions are treated in pre-
cisely the same manner. Section 4.7(a) notes that, “[u]nless a different disposition is 
                                                          
 37. See City of Brentwood v. Barron Holdings International, Ltd., 66 S.W.3d 139 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). 
 38. Restatement of the Law (Third) of Property: Mortgages (1997) (hereinafter “Restatement”). 
 39. 913 P.2d 286 (Okla. 1995). 
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provided in the mortgage, the mortgagee has a right to the following funds . . . to the 
extent that the mortgagee’s security has been impaired[,]” then referencing “(1) the 
proceeds paid by a casualty insurer due to the occurrence of an insured loss to the 
real estate . . . and (2) an award resulting from a taking of all or part of the real estate 
under power of eminent domain . . . .40 From such language, section 4.7 leaves no 
doubt that, in the absence of some other disposition being contractually agreed to by 
the parties, it is the mortgagee—not the mortgagor—who has the priority claim, to 
the extent necessary to preserve the security for the loan it has given, against casualty 
insurance awards and taking awards. When this simple rule is supplemented with lan-
guage in a security instrument, like the language reviewed above in the Uniform Fan-
nie/Freddie instruments41 or that in the mortgage in the illustrative Oklahoma case 
mentioned earlier,42 the priority nature of a claim by a mortgagee/lender over that of 
a mortgagor/borrower would appear incontrovertible. 
Section 4.8 of the Restatement Third is also informative. The section itself ad-
dresses the effect of foreclosure on a right to the proceeds of a casualty insurance 
policy or those of an eminent domain action.43 Unfortunately, however, the insight 
it offers centers not on the rights of the mortgagor, which is what is of direct interest 
to us, but rather on those of the mortgagee/lender. Even taking this limitation into 
consideration, it is clear that the section treats proceeds from insurance awards and 
those from eminent domain actions in precisely the same way. Essentially, section 4.8 
provides that, assuming a mortgagee has rights to either the proceeds of an insurance 
or eminent domain award pursuant to section 4.7, then foreclosure does not some-
how impair the mortgagee’s rights and transfer such to the mortgagor/borrower.44 
More specifically, section 4.8 provides that when a mortgagee/lender has rights 
to casualty insurance or eminent domain proceeds, and a mortgagor/borrower has 
defaulted and is subject to foreclosure, the mortgagee has a choice of how to proceed: 
it can, if such an amount is available, recover from the insurance of eminent domain 
proceeds the full amount of the outstanding loan balance; or, it can foreclose on the 
subject property and, if such fails to satisfy the remaining loan obligation, recover the 
residual owed from the insurance or eminent domain proceeds.45 The section further 
provides that, in the event the mortgagee decides to first move against the insurance 
or condemnation proceeds, the mortgagee may not access those funds beyond the 
amount of the remaining loan balance.46 Likewise, if the mortgagee decides upon 
foreclosure first, subsequent access by the mortgagee to the proceeds of a casualty 
insurance policy or an eminent domain award shall not be in excess of what continues 
                                                          
 40. See Restatement, supra note 38, at 286, § 4.7. 
 41. See text accompanying supra notes 15-21. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Restatement, supra note 38, at 301, § 8. 
 44. The rights of the mortgagee extend to either getting at insurance or eminent domain proceeds to satisfy the 
full outstanding amount of the loan obligation, or foreclose on the property to satisfy such, and, if the latter is 
unsatisfactory, then proceed against the insurance or eminent domain award for the difference. 
 45. See Restatement, supra note 38, at 301, § 4.8(a). 
 46. See id. 
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to be owed by the mortgagor given the sales revenues generated by the foreclosure 
action.47 
Corroborating this understanding of the Restatement’s equivalent treatment of 
insurance and condemnation awards is the above referenced Oklahoma case of Wil-
son v. Glancy.48 In that 1995 Oklahoma Supreme Court case, a second mortgage was 
the subject of the dispute. Following a default on the mortgage by the mortgagor/
borrower, the second mortgagee commenced a foreclosure action. During that 
lengthy process, the mortgaged property suffered fire damage, with both the mort-
gagor and the second mortgagee disputing how the proceeds of the casualty insurance 
policy should be distributed. In time, the foreclosure action on the second mortgage 
was completed with the property being sold to the second mortgagee, who had bid 
the full debt amount of the second mortgagor. No mention was made, in the fore-
closure action on the second mortgage, of either the fire damage or the casualty in-
surance policy.49 Thereafter, the second mortgagee and the original mortgagor be-
came embroiled in a dispute regarding the casualty insurance proceeds. Though the 
trial court, in the case, directed that the insurance company pay the proceeds to the 
mortgagor, both the appellate court and the Supreme Court agreed that it was the 
second mortgagee, and not the mortgagor who had the superior claim against the 
proceeds.50 
While, once again, Wilson involves a claim to insurance proceeds, and not pro-
ceeds from a condemnation award, it does contain some interesting language, assum-
ing one starts from the premise in the Restatement, that the two awards are entitled 
to equivalent treatment. The Supreme Court opinion states that the casualty insur-
ance policy at issue in the case was the usual so-called union or standard insurance 
policy—that is to say, one that provides payments resulting from a claim shall be to 
both the mortgagor, who would typically contract for the policy, as well as the mort-
gagee (here, second mortgagee), who would seek to have its security protected. It 
then noted that, until a foreclosure sale and subsequent confirmation of such under 
Oklahoma law, the mortgagor/borrower continues to have an interest in the subject 
property in the form of a right of equitable redemption. And, as long as such a re-
demptive right remains extant, the mortgagor continues to have a right to casualty 
insurance proceeds. But once foreclosure occurs, a sheriff’s sale is made, and the 
court issues an order confirming the sale, the effect is to divest the mortgagor/bor-
rower, leaving an interest remaining only in the mortgagee/lender (here, the second 
mortgagee). 
In the words of the Supreme Court’s opinion, “inherent in the present case was 
the mortgagor’s right to redeem the property which would have entitled the mort-
gagor to the insurance proceeds. The mortgagor may not be divested of title until the 
                                                          
 47. See id. 
 48. 913 P.2d 286. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
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right to redeem is extinguished by foreclosure decree and foreclosure sale.”51 It fur-
ther declares that “the right to redemption is not foreclosed until the sheriff’s sale is 
confirmed.”52 And finally it observes that “[t]he rights of the mortgagor to redeem 
the property were divested in the present case when the sheriff’s sale was confirmed. 
Therefore, the mortgagor is not entitled to any of the insurance proceeds.”53 As a 
consequence, the decision was to hold that the second mortgagee/lender, who had 
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale, was the party most appropriately en-
titled to the proceeds of the casualty insurance. 
The Wilson case leaves little doubt that, once a foreclosure sale has been con-
firmed, any interest in the property that would entitle the mortgagor to make a claim 
against casualty insurance proceeds representing that property effectively termi-
nates.54 The fact the sale results in a purchase by the mortgagee/lender precipitating 
the foreclosure action strengthens that mortgagee’s interest in insurance proceeds, 
simultaneously undercutting any interest on the part of the mortgagor. When the 
teachings of Wilson are taken in conjunction with the Restatement’s indication of 
equivalency between the handling of insurance proceeds and proceeds from condem-
nation, ample reason exists to believe that, whenever the subject property has under-
gone a foreclosure, a mortgagor whose property is sold at foreclosure sale is not in 
an especially desirable position to make a claim to proceeds of an earlier condemna-
tion award. If the linchpin for a claim by a mortgagor to casualty insurance proceeds 
is the presence of a redemptive right, confirmation of a foreclosure sale would thus 
eliminate any claim by a mortgagor to sums earlier awarded in satisfaction of a gov-
ernment taking. It also cannot be stressed strongly enough that the teaching of Wilson 
regarding casualty insurance proceeds comports perfectly with that of City of Brentwood 
regarding proceeds of a condemnation award.55 
V. DISTINGUISHING POPULAR MORTGAGE SERVICING, INC. V. AMES 
As has just been seen, Wilson holds it is the mortgagee (there, the second mort-
gagee), and not the mortgagor/borrower, who has the claim to casualty insurance 
proceeds flowing from a compensable hazard incurred by mortgaged property prior 
to that property being sold at a foreclosure sale. In a later 2009 Oklahoma Court of 
Civil Appeals decision in Popular Mortgage Servicing, Inc. v. Ames, a case involving quite 
similar facts, it was the mortgagor who was held to have a superior claim to proceeds 
of a casualty insurance policy.56 That decision, however, is distinguishable on a couple 
of significant grounds, and it does not undercut any of the three reasons for holding 
foreclosure sale confirmation as cutting off a mortgagor’s ability to directly claim ac-
cess to proceeds of an earlier condemnation award. 
                                                          
 51. Id. at 290. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Wilson, 913 P.2d at 290. 
 54. See id., 913 P.2d at 286, citing an Oklahoma statute, requiring any excess of casualty insurance proceeds over 
the outstanding balance on the foreclosed mortgage to be paid to the mortgagor/defendant suffering foreclosure. 
 55. See text accompanying supra notes 24-35. 
 56. 212 P.3d 495, 498 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009). 
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The facts in Popular Mortgage involved a default and commencement of foreclo-
sure action against a couple of mortgagors. Subsequent to the foreclosure action be-
ginning, the mortgaged property suffered damage as a result of a fire, with the casualty 
insurance company issuing a check covering the loss payable to the mortgagors and 
the mortgagee.57 Roughly one month later the foreclosure process was completed, 
with the subject property being sold at foreclosure sale, and an order issued confirm-
ing the sheriff’s sale to independent, third-party purchasers.58 Thereafter, the mort-
gagors and the purchasers at the foreclosure sale fell into disagreement regarding ac-
cess to the casualty insurance proceeds. The mortgagee, Popular Mortgage Servicing, 
then brought court action requesting a determination regarding the competing claims 
of the mortgagors and the foreclosure sale purchasers.59 The trial court held in favor 
of the mortgagors, with the Court of Civil Appeals affirming that determination. 
In understanding the appellate court decision in favor of the mortgagors in Pop-
ular Mortgage, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in favor of the mortgagee 
in Wilson, two matters must be fully appreciated. Both serve to indicate why the for-
mer is distinguishable from the latter. First, the timing of the loss to the property 
triggering the casualty insurance policy occurred prior to the confirmation of the 
foreclosure sale. Second, the dispute over the funds in controversy in Popular Mortgage 
was not a dispute between the mortgagee/lender and the mortgagors/borrowers, as 
was the case in Wilson; rather, it was a dispute between the mortgagors and the third-
party purchasers at the foreclosure sale. 
With respect to the first of these—the timing of the loss in relation to the con-
firmation of foreclosure sale—there seems every reason to believe that the only par-
ties positioned to be able to make a claim to the proceeds of a casualty insurance 
policy should be those that had an interest in the insured property at the time the loss 
to the property occurred. Clearly, that would include only the mortgagor, who owned 
the subject property and paid insurance premiums to insure it, and the mortgagee/
lender, who loaned the mortgage money permitting the property to be purchased, 
and had an interest in assuring that its security for the repayment of the loan would 
not be compromised by loss or damage to the property. No interest in the property 
existed at all, at the time the property was damaged, in the independent, third-party 
foreclosure sale purchaser.60 In view of that, in a dispute over the casualty insurance 
proceeds concerning a loss occurring prior to a foreclosure being confirmed, where 
a mortgagor is paired against a third-party foreclosure sale purchaser, the mortgagor 
is to be preferred. 
The language of the appellate court in Popular Mortgage makes that very point. It 
notes that, “where the covered property suffers an insured loss after proceedings to 
                                                          
 57. See id. at 496. 
 58. See id. 
 59. See id. at 496-97. 
 60. This is an idea reminiscent of what has already been stated supra note 6. 
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foreclose . . . have been commenced, but before confirmation of the sale . . . the in-
sured mortgagor is entitled to payment of the insurance proceeds . . . .”61 The court 
continues by noting that the mortgagor’s claim is nonetheless “subject to the equita-
ble claim of the secured mortgagee.”62 The key, in the opinion’s estimation, is the 
fact the loss is suffered prior to the confirmation of the foreclosure sale. After all, not 
until such confirmation does any purchaser at foreclosure have an interest in the 
property that would support a argument that loss of or damage thereto would entitle 
it to advance a claim to casualty insurance or condemnation proceeds standing in the 
stead of the property itself. 
With respect to the second point of distinction between Popular Mortgage and 
Wilson—the parties whom the dispute involved—there can be no question that, from 
the language of the decision, this is also significant. As the opinion provides: “The 
purchaser at sheriff’s sale acquires an interest which, prior to confirmation, the pur-
chaser may insure, but a sheriff’s sale purchaser ordinarily has no claim to the pro-
ceeds of the mortgagor’s insurance until the rights of both the mortgagor and mort-
gagee are fixed by confirmation of the sale.”63 
It makes sense to see a mortgagor and a mortgagee, prior to a confirmed fore-
closure sale, as having an interest in the proceeds of a casualty insurance award, or a 
condemnation award. To the mortgagor, the proceeds of such an award stand in the 
place of the property on which a mortgage has been given. To the mortgagee, such 
proceeds represent substitute security for the repayment of the loan. While the ability 
of a mortgagor to claim an interest in such proceeds is affected by a foreclosure sale, 
as long as no such sale has been completed and confirmed, the mortgagor retains 
rights to the proceeds. However, in a situation where a controversy regarding such 
proceeds involves not the mortgagor and mortgagee, but rather the mortgagor and 
an independent, otherwise not involved, third-party purchaser at the foreclosure sale, 
the situation is radically altered.64 Whereas in a mortgagor/mortgagee dispute, a 
mortgagor’s ability to claim insurance or condemnation proceeds turns on whether 
confirmation of a foreclosure sale has extinguished the mortgagor’s right of redemp-
tion, in the event of a dispute between a mortgagor and a third-party purchaser at 
foreclosure, the existence of a confirmed foreclosure sale becomes less important 
than precisely when the operative event giving rise to the relevant proceeds actually 
occurred. 
The other thing worth calling attention to in connection with Popular Mortgage 
concerns the fact the appellate court opinion makes no mention of the earlier Okla-
homa Supreme Court decision in Wilson. This stands to reason, given that the two 
factual features just addressed indicate its separation and distinguishability from the 
facts confronted by the appellate court in Popular Mortgage. The case most heavily 
                                                          
 61. Popular Mortgage, 212 P.3d at 498 (emphasis added). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 498-99. 
 64. It is worth noting that in the Wilson case, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale was not an independent, third-
party purchaser, but the mortgagee (albeit second mortgagee) whose price was the full value of the property.  See 913 
P.2d 286. 
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relied upon by that appellate court decision was Willis v. Nowata Land and Cattle Co., 
Inc.,65 handed down by the Oklahoma Supreme Court half a dozen years prior to the 
same court’s decision in Wilson. Without going into extensive detail regarding that 
earlier decision, suffice it to say that, as in Wilson, the casualty insurance proceeds 
dispute it involved pitted the mortgagor/borrower against the mortgagee/lender. 
What distinguishes that earliest of cases from even Wilson concerns the fact it dealt 
with fire damage to mortgaged property after confirmation of a foreclosure sale had 
been stayed. The effect of such stay, according to Justice Opala’s opinion for the 
majority, was to leave intact the pre-existing mortgagor/mortgagee relationship, thus 
permitting the mortgagor to expect a credit against any insurance proceed payments, 
and the mortgagee to see all such payments as an indemnity for the property lost that 
represented security for the loan it had extended.66 
VI. CONSIDERATIONS CAUSING CONCERN 
As examined in the preceding pages, there seems good reason to believe that, 
after a confirmation of a foreclosure sale, a mortgagor is not in a position to make a 
claim against casualty insurance or condemnation proceeds for damage, loss, or tak-
ing occurring prior thereto. The language of many security instruments indicate such 
rights transfer to the mortgagee upon entering into the borrower/lender relationship. 
And while there is no case law clearly determining a mortgagor loses the right to 
successfully advance such a claim after confirmation of a foreclosure sale, at least one 
case indicates a mortgagor has an insufficient interest in a condemnation award to 
direct its disbursement after a foreclosure sale has been confirmed, and a variety of 
cases in Oklahoma indicate that the same kind of approach applies, though to a wide 
number of circumstances, when it comes to mortgagor claims against the proceeds 
of a casualty insurance award. Despite all of this, and corroboration received from 
sections 4.7 and 4.8 of the Restatement, any impartial legal scholar would have to 
acknowledge that there are a couple of reasons to be nervous about the accuracy of 
the conclusion that the law cuts off the mortgagor’s rights after foreclosure confir-
mation. 
One reason has to do with the possible perception that it is unfair to prevent a 
mortgagor, who after all through no fault of its own, but rather solely because of 
action of a government entity, has suffered a loss while title was still in the mort-
gagor’s hands, from making a claim against the proceeds of a condemnation award, 
simply because the claim it advances is brought subsequent to the confirmation of a 
foreclosure sale. The basic problem with this argument, however, is that, even though 
the mortgagor might be prevented from directly advancing a claim for the sums pay-
able due to condemnation, presumably the amount paid at foreclosure sale represents 
the property’s value as reduced by the extent of the government taking, and, since 
the condemnation award will go to reducing the debt owed to the mortgagee/lender, 
                                                          
 65. 789 P.2d 1282 (Okla. 1989).  
 66. See id. at 1285 (“Had the lenders pressed for a deficiency judgment, the borrower clearly would not have been 
barred from counterclaiming for surplus or any other credit.”); id. at 1287 (“[I]nsurance proceeds under standard 
mortgage clause represent indemnity for loss or harm to lenders’ own interest.”) (emphasis omitted). 
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the mortgagor, nonetheless, indirectly benefits. In other words, though the mort-
gagor, following a foreclosure confirmation, cannot expect the court to permit it to 
advance a successful claim to the condemnation award, funds from the award col-
lected by the mortgagee/lender are to be applied to reducing the extent of the finan-
cial obligation owed by the mortgagor on the original loan. For purposes of conser-
vation of judicial resources, courts might be inclined to ignore the absence of interest 
on the part of the mortgagor following a foreclosure confirmation and, thus, allow a 
direct claim by the mortgagor.67 Though this may seem a trifle, it would appear pref-
erable, especially for purposes of maintaining a degree of consistency in the law, for 
the mortgagor to be denied direct access to proceeds from a condemnation award, 
forcing access to be gotten indirectly as a result of participation by the mortgagee/
lender, and application of such proceeds to a reduction of the debt owed by the bor-
rower to the lender. 
In the event that the proceeds of a condemnation award have already been paid 
into the court by the government entity responsible for the taking, this would not 
present a difficulty. Already having control over those monies, the court could dis-
burse it to the mortgagee/lender with instructions that it be credited against the out-
standing loan balance of the mortgagor. Doing such would both remove those pro-
ceeds from access by the mortgagor and still eventuate in the mortgagor receiving the 
benefit of those same proceeds. On the other hand, in the event such proceeds are 
not under the court’s physical control—such as where the purchaser at the foreclo-
sure sale may be the very same government entity responsible for the taking determi-
nation that led to the condemnation award being ordered, and that entity, for what-
ever reason, has yet to transmit such proceeds for disbursement68—it may thus be 
imperative that the mortgagee/lender be involved in any proceedings concerning the 
access to or payment of the awarded sums. As has been argued throughout, once 
there has been confirmation of any foreclosure sale, the mortgagor/borrower lacks 
any interest sufficient to permit it to seek direct control over the earlier condemnation 
award. 
Putting aside what has just been said, the other reason that might give rise to 
some general nervousness about the accuracy of viewing foreclosure sale confirma-
tion as cutting off claims by a mortgagor to an earlier condemnation award concerns 
one of the specific illustrations utilized in the above referenced section 4.8 of the 
Restatement.69 As will be recalled from the discussion of the Popular Mortgage decision 
in the preceding section of this essay,70 occasional indications in the law that a mort-
gagor/borrower continues to have a legal right to condemnation or casualty insur-
ance proceeds subsequent to a confirmed foreclosure sale of that mortgagor’s interest 
                                                          
 67. This seems to be the result the court was attempting to reach in the Oklahoma case referenced for its illus-
trative mortgage. See Smith v ODOT, supra note 6 (opinion indicating that the mortgagee in the case, Arvest Bank, 
had already sought and obtained a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor since the foreclosure sale brought 
insufficient funds to satisfy the remaining outstanding mortgage balance).  
 68. This was the circumstance in Smith v. ODOT, supra note 6. 
 69. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text. 
 70. See text accompanying supra notes 51-61. 
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in the subject property prove nettlesome when it comes to suggestions that confir-
mation of such a sale extinguishes the mortgagor’s right to access those proceeds. 
Popular Mortgage, however, is explicable for being not only a dispute between the mort-
gagor and an independent, third-party purchaser at the foreclosure sale, but also for 
it involving a claim by such a purchaser to a property in which it had absolutely no 
interest at the time the harm triggering the casualty insurance claim was suffered.71 
Section 4.8 of the Restatement, particularly in its comment (c), contains an illus-
tration 10 that, like Popular Mortgage, indicates a circumstance under which a mort-
gagor would be entitled to proceeds from a casualty insurance or condemnation 
award.72 As a consequence, illustration 10 would appear to contradict the notion that 
has been advanced throughout this essay. It will be recalled that section 4.8 focuses 
on a mortgagee/lender getting at the proceeds of a casualty insurance policy or an 
eminent domain award in the context of a foreclosure. In that context, the full lan-
guage of illustration 10 provides for a condemnation award of $80,000 and a mort-
gage balance of $70,000. It then continues by stating that, under such circumstances, 
the  
Mortgagee may recover $70,000 of the award. Upon receipt . . . the mortgage obliga-
tion is satisfied and Mortgagee has no further recourse against either the remainder of 
[the property serving as security] or Mortgagor. Absent a valid claim by a junior 
lienholder . . . the remainder of the condemnation award is payable to Mortgagor.73 
The italicized language makes clear that circumstances do indeed exist in which 
the mortgagor/borrower can access the proceeds of a condemnation award in the 
context of having their loan foreclosed. This, however, should in no way be seen as 
somehow in conflict or inconsistent with the basic notion expressed throughout that, 
once a mortgagor has suffered a foreclosure sale, and it has been confirmed by the 
court, all interest on the part of the mortgagor that would otherwise entitle it to ad-
vance a direct claim against condemnation proceeds has been extinguished. Apart 
from the language of illustration 10 placing absolutely no significance on access 
sought prior to or following confirmation of a foreclosure sale, it is indubitable that 
it recognizes access only under a particular set of very limited circumstances. Specif-
ically, the illustration requires that the proceeds earlier awarded in condemnation ex-
ceed the amount of the remaining mortgage obligation. 
This makes total sense. If a mortgagor holds title to a piece of property that 
suffers a government taking, it should be the mortgagor that benefits from proceeds 
awarded for the government’s action. The mortgagee/lender has every right to expect 
that the proceeds of the award are to be used to pay off the mortgage balance. Any 
excess beyond that balance, though, is to be expected not by the mortgagee, but by 
the mortgagor. To recognize, as illustration 10 does, that such excess is to be paid to 
the mortgagor, does not at all acknowledge that under every set of factual conditions 
the mortgagor has direct access to the proceeds of a condemnation award. It is con-
sonant with the notion that a mortgagor cannot have direct access to the proceeds of 
                                                          
 71. See 212 P.3d 495. 
 72. See Restatement, supra note 38, at 306, § 4.8(c), illustration 10. 
 73. See id. (emphasis added). 
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an earlier government taking after confirmation of a foreclosure sale to conclude that 
such a mortgagor can expect to receive the benefit of the amount by which such 
proceeds exceed the loan balance then owed. Where would be the fairness in permit-
ting the mortgagee/lender to benefit from such excess, the government entity whose 
actions precipitated the taking claim to expect such excess to be refunded to it, or the 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale to secure a windfall by the acquisition of a property 
suffering a taking while the property was not then under its ownership? 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The usual posture in which a dispute between a mortgagor and mortgagee over 
proceeds of a condemnation award comes before the courts does not involve a fore-
closure and sale of the affected property after the government taking triggering the 
award. Our attention here has been on just such a dispute, with the question ad-
dressed concerning whether a foreclosure sale and subsequent confirmation extin-
guishes the interest of the mortgagor to advance a successful claim to control the 
proceeds of the earlier condemnation award? A distinct paucity of case law exists on 
this narrow, technical matter. What little can be found strongly suggests, however, 
that the mortgagor retains a sufficient interest to advance a direct claim to the earlier 
award up until there has been a court confirmation of the foreclosure sale. The ana-
logue between proceeds of a casualty insurance award, and those incident to a con-
demnation award, provide solid corroboration for this view. And while there may be 
admitted points of hesitancy regarding this position, ample reason is present to be-
lieve the position’s basic soundness is not thereby undermined. In no event, however, 
should it be thought the original mortgagor/borrower is left without protection. 
Even though the mortgagor may have no ability to submit a direct claim to the con-
demnation award, the award is to be applied to reducing the balance of debt owed 
on the security instrument binding the original mortgagor/borrower. 
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